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I
INTRODUCTION
Country-wide, more than 5000 hospitals are permitted to provide Medicare-
financed services solely because they are accredited by the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (the "JCAHO" or the "Joint
Commission"). With JCAHO accreditation, a health care institution is deemed
to meet the Medicare conditions of participation. This "deemed status"
program is the oldest and most substantial regulatory use of health care
accreditation in the United States. This article will critically consider the
economic and political forces driving the program and will examine why the
federal government has relied on private accreditation in health care and
whether this reliance is in the public interest.
This article will first describe the JCAHO and its accreditation programs,
then review the history of the Medicare-JCAHO relationship, next examine why
the federal Medicare program has relied on accreditation as an indicator of the
quality of participating hospitals, and finally consider, in theory and practice, the
extent to which accreditation status serves as an adequate substitute for direct
public regulation of the quality of health care institutions.
II
THE JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE
ORGANIZATIONS
The JCAHO is a private, nonprofit corporation that currently accredits more
than 9000 health care institutions, including about 5400 hospitals.' Its twenty-
six member board includes twenty-one commissioners appointed by the
American Medical Association (seven commissioners), the American Hospital
Association (seven), the American College of Physicians (three), the American
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College of Surgeons (three), and the American Dental Association (one).2 The
remaining commissioners consist of one nurse and four (six starting in 1994)
members of the general public. The JCAHO has an annual budget of $80
million and 450 employees at its headquarters, as well as 150 full-time and 350
part-time surveyors and consultants.
The JCAHO grew out of the Hospital Standardization Program (the "HSP")
of the American College of Surgeons (the "ACS").3 The HSP began in 1919
as an attempt to standardize hospital facilities in the face of the appalling
conditions then common in institutional health care.4 The JCAHO itself was
established in 1951 as a joint effort of the major organizations representing
hospitals and physicians when the burden of the HSP became too great for the
ACS to bear alone.5 Although the hospital accreditation program is its oldest
and best known program, the JCAHO enjoys similar authority over ambulatory
care,6 long-term care,7 and psychiatric facilities,' as well as home care pro-
grams.9 It has recently established an accreditation program for health care
networks.' ° In addition, the JCAHO produces a variety of publications and
offers technical assistance and consulting services to health care facilities."
Hospitals accredited by the JCAHO are surveyed at least once every three
years. At minimum, a survey team includes a hospital administrator, a
2. Joint Commission Bylaws, Article VI, Section 1. A slightly dated description of the Joint
Commission is found in JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS,
COMMITTED TO QUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF
HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS (1990) [hereinafter JOINT COMMISSION].
3. Histories of the HSP and of the Joint Commission are found in Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals: Public Regulation of Health Care and the Public
Interest, 24 B.C. L. REV. 835, 845-59 (1983); James S. Roberts et al., A History of the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals, 258 JAMA 936 (1987).
4. Jost, supra note 3, at 848; Roberts, supra note 3, at 936.
5. Jost, supra note 3, at 850-51; Roberts, supra note 3, at 938.
6. This category includes ambulatory care clinics, ambulatory surgical centers, college or university
health programs, community health centers, group practices, armed services ambulatory programs,
cardiac catheterization centers, Native American health service centers, primary care centers, and ur-
gent/emergency care centers. JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 15.
7. This category includes both hospital-based and free-standing facilities. Id. at 16.
8. This category includes alcohol and substance abuse programs, community mental health centers,
forensic psychiatry services, programs for persons with mental retardation and/or other developmental
disabilities, and general psychiatric/mental health programs. Id.
9. This category includes private duty agencies providing care at home, rehabilitation organizations
providing speech/language pathology, occupational, and/or physical therapy services in the home,
intravenous therapy companies, organizations providing respiratory services in the home, home medical
equipment companies providing equipment and patient/client instruction in the home, and pediatric
home care agencies. Id.
10. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, 1994 JOINT
COMMISSION STANDARDS FOR HEALTH CARE NETWORKS (1994) [hereinafter JOINT COMMISSION
STANDARDS].
11. See JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 49-56. Although the Joint Commission maintains that
it has established procedures to avoid conflicts, concerns have been raised about the potential conflict
of interest of the Joint Commission both accrediting health care facilities and marketing consulting
services to advise facilities how to obtain accreditation. Brian McCormick, GAO Faults Public, Private
Hospital Accreditation, 34 AM. MED. NEWS, June 10, 1991, at 8.
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physician, and a nurse.12  The survey generally lasts three days. At the
conclusion of the survey, the surveyors score each of hundreds of applicable
standards on a scale from one to five. These scores are then aggregated using
complex algorithms to reach an accreditation decision.13 While approximately
one-quarter of surveyed hospitals receive full accreditation, most receive
accreditation with contingencies that must be resolved through further reports
or inspections. 14 Less than one percent of the hospitals surveyed are denied
accreditation.15
The JCAHO updates its accreditation standards regularly, based on input
from its staff, advisory committees, and outside experts.16 Traditionally,
JCAHO accreditation standards focused on the structural inputs (policies,
equipment, staffing) found within hospitals.17 Over the past four years, the
Commission has aggressively pursued its Agenda for Change,18 which shifts its
focus toward an emphasis on processes and outcomes.19 Under the Agenda for
Change, the JCAHO is revising its accreditation manuals to streamline its
standards, redirect its standards from their current focus on departmental
organization to a focus on institutional functions or processes, stress the
interdisciplinary task of assessing and improving quality, increase the flexibility
afforded providers in complying with the standards, and emphasize performance.
It is also developing outcome indicators that will allow hospitals to monitor
trends and patterns of care with the aim of improving patient care.2' Finally,
it is concurrently revising its survey process to make it more timely, consistent,
and useful to accredited institutions.
12. JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 24-26.
13. See JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, MAKING
ACCREDITATION DECISIONS FOR HOSPITALS (1993).
14. See Full Survey Decision Outcomes, JOINT COMMISSION PERSPECTIVES, July-Aug. 1991, at 16.
15. Id.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 170-71; see also Jost, supra note 3, at 886-92. The Joint
Commission claims that 42 states rely in whole or in part on its accreditation for licensure of hospitals.
JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, STATE STATUS REPORT
(1992). In response to a recent survey conducted by the advocacy group Public Citizen, 26 states
identified themselves as relying solely on JCAHO accreditation for licensure of hospitals, 16 stated that
they did not rely on accreditation, and the remaining states considered JCAHO results or otherwise
utilized JCAHO surveys or survey reports in their licensure process. JOAN STIEBER & SIDNEY M.
WOLFE, WHO'S WATCHING OUR HOSPITALS? 8-9 (1994).
17. Michael G. H. McGeary, Medicare Conditions of Participation and Accreditation for Hospitals,
in 2 MEDICARE: A STRATEGY FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE 292, 311-17 (Kathleen N. Lohr ed., 1990).
18. See JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 41-43.
19. Mary T. Koska, New JCAHO Standards Emphasize Continuous Quality Improvement,
HOSPITALS, Aug. 5, 1991, at 41; Joyce A. Lanning & Stephen J. O'Connor, Health Care Quality
Quagmire: Some Signposts, 35 HoSP. & HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. 39 (1990); Richard E. Thompson,
From Quality Assurance to Continuous Quality Improvement, PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE, Sept.-Oct. 1991,
at 3.
20. See Mary T. Koska, JCAHO: Pilot Hospitals' Input Updates Agenda for Change, HOSPITALS,
Jan. 5, 1990, at 50 (describing the Agenda for Change); Koska, supra note 19, at 41 (same); Dennis S.
O'Leary, Accreditation in the Quality Improvement Mold-A Vision for Tomorrow, QRB, Mar. 1991,
at 72 (same); see also David Burda, JCAHO Hits a Wall With Plan on Indicators, MOD. HEALTHCARE,
Mar. 14, 1994, at 30 (describing problems encountered in this effort).
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III
THE JOINT COMMISSION AND MEDICARE RELATIONSHIP: HISTORY AND
CURRENT STATUS
The federal Medicare program was created in 1965. Since its inception, the
Medicare program has accepted, or "deemed," Joint Commission accreditation
as equivalent to compliance with Medicare certification standards. That is, the
federal government accepts accredited hospitals as Medicare providers without
additional direct review.21 The original 1965 Medicare statute acknowledged
JCAHO authority not only by granting deemed status to JCAHO-accredited
hospitals,22 but also by prohibiting the federal government from imposing any
additional requirements on such hospitals.' Furthermore, the statute made no
provision for federal auditing of the Joint Commission's accreditation process.
Indeed, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW")-the
agency charged with administering Medicare---did not even have access to
JCAHO accreditation reports to determine the basis (or lack thereof) for
accreditation decisions.24
In the late 1970s, several consumer groups expressed dissatisfaction with
using JCAHO accreditation as conclusive evidence of acceptable quality in
hospitals.' This dissatisfaction led to the filing of a lawsuit challenging
deemed status.26 Amendments to the Social Security Act in 1972 responded to
these concerns. Statutory changes permitted HEW to require accredited
hospitals to comply with Medicare certification standards more stringent than
those of the JCAHO,27 required random and complaint-based inspections by
state agencies to validate JCAHO judgments,' permitted decertification of
21. A separate certification program was created to grant Medicare participation status based on
inspections by state survey agencies to hospitals that were not Joint Commission accredited. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395x(e)(1988 & Supp. III 1991); 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.1-482.66 (1993).
22. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 102(a), § 1865,79 Stat. 286, 326-27
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). Accredited hospitals also had
to have a utilization review plan in place to be certified for Medicare participation, though the statute
provided that if the Joint Commission required utilization review, accredited hospitals would not be
required to meet this requirement independent of accreditation.
23. Id. § 1861(e)(8), 79 Stat. at 315; see William Worthington & Laurens H. Silver, Regulation of
Quality of Care in Hospitals: The Need for Change, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305, 313 (Spring
1970) (discussing this provision). This provision was subject to the exception that if states imposed
requirements higher than JCAHO requirements for their Medicaid programs or obtained federal
permission to impose higher requirements for Medicare hospitals, the federal government would require
hospitals to meet these requirements. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec.
102(a), §§ 1863, 1865, 79 Stat. 286, 325-27; Worthington & Silver, supra, at 322, 323.
24. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 102(a), §§ 1861(e)(8), 1865,
79 Stat. 286, 315, 326-27.
25. Jost, supra note 3, at 855-56.
26. Self-Help for the Elderly v. Richardson, No. 2016-71 (D.D.C. 1972). This case was dismissed
after the 1972 amendments mooted the issues it raised.
27. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 244(b)(1), 86 Stat. 1329, 1423
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a)(4) (1988)).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1395aa(c) (1988).
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accredited hospitals that failed to comply with JCAHO requirements,29 and
compelled accredited hospitals to release Joint Commission survey reports to
HEW for validation survey purposes.' The 1972 amendments established the
basic framework for the ongoing relationship between Medicare and the Joint
Commission.
In the intervening two decades, there have been adjustments of that
relationship with respect to information disclosure and validation procedures.
In 1975, in response to a consumer organization's Freedom of Information Act
request, HEW released copies of letters that the Joint Commission had sent to
hospitals identifying deficiencies and that HEW had received from those
hospitals under the 1972 amendments.31 The Joint Commission sued to
maintain the confidentiality of its accreditation documents.32 The parties
settled the suit with an agreement that HEW would not release to the public
Joint Commission accreditation letters or accompanying recommendations or
comments.
33
In 1989, Congress amended the Medicare law to grant the Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS") (which succeeded HEW in administering
Medicare) more extensive access to accreditation documents. That legislation
required all deemed status hospitals to authorize the Joint Commission to
release, upon request, to HHS or to a state survey agency a copy of the most
recent Joint Commission accreditation survey, whether or not the facility was
undergoing a validation survey.' These amendments respected the 1975
compromise, however, authorizing HHS to redisclose accreditation information
only to the extent it related to an enforcement action taken by the Secretary of
HHS.
35
In 1990 and 1991, the General Accounting Office ("GAO") released several
reports expressing concern about the federal government's validation process for
deemed status hospitals, and congressional hearings were held to review these
concerns.36 In response, HHS attempted to tighten up the validation process,
in particular, committing itself to creating an annual "crosswalk" to determine
29. Id. § 1395bb(b).
30. Id. § 1395bb(a).
31. Jost, supra note 3, at 856.
32. Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Hosp. v. Weinberger, No. 75C175 (N.D.Ill. Oct 8, 1975)
(dismissed by stipulation).
33. Id.
34. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6019(a), 103 Stat. 2106,
2165-66 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a) (1988).
36. GAO, HEALTH CARE: HCFA NEEDS BETTER ASSURANCE THAT HOSPITALS MEET
MEDICARE CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION, GAO Doc. T-HRD-90-44 (June 21,1990); GAO, HEALTH
CARE CRITERIA USED TO EVALUATE HOSPITAL ACCREDITATION PROCESS NEED REEVALUATION,
GAO Doc. HRD-90-89 (June 11, 1990) [hereinafter GAO, CRITERIA]; GAO, HEALTH CARE:
HOSPITALS wiTH QUALITY-OF-CARE PROBLEMS NEED CLOSER MONITORING, GAO DoC. HRD-91-40
(May 9, 1991) [hereinafter GAO, MONITORING]; GAO, HEALTH CARE: ACTIONS TO TERMINATE
PROBLEM HOSPITALS FROM MEDICARE ARE INADEQUATE, GAO DOC. HRD-91-54 (Sept. 5, 1991)
[hereinafter GAO, INADEQUATE].
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the congruence between Joint Commission accreditation standards and the
Medicare conditions of participation on which deemed status depends.37 This
crosswalk, which HHS now attempts to create annually, is intended to assure
that compliance with accreditation standards in fact equates with compliance
with the Medicare conditions of participation.
Though the Joint Commission's role in determining Medicare participation
status for hospitals is its most important federal regulatory function, it is not the
only instance in which the federal government has relied on the Joint
Commission for regulation. Until 1984, psychiatric hospitals had to be
accredited by the Joint Commission to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid
programs in most instances. 38 In particular, inpatient psychiatric hospitals for
persons under the age of twenty-one could provide Medicaid-financed care only
if they were Joint-Commission accredited.39 Cospito v. Heckler' upheld the
constitutionality of this legislation against an improper delegation challenge, but
only after the court imposed a very strained interpretation on the statute.
Congress amended the law in 1984 to eliminate the accreditation require-
ment.41
The federal government has also relied upon private accreditation of medical
laboratories. The Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act of 1967 ("CLIA")
exempted laboratories in Joint Commission-accredited hospitals or laboratories
accredited by organizations approved by the Secretary of HEW from the Act's
licensing requirements.42 The 1988 revision of CLIA removed this provision,
instead permitting deemed status for accredited laboratories only upon a
determination by HHS that the accreditation agency meets HHS requirements
for frequency of inspections, stringency of standards, and communication with
HHS.43 The Joint Commission has applied for deemed status recognition for
laboratories it accredits, but HHS has taken no final action on this application.
In May of 1981, the Reagan Department of HHS proposed deemed status
certification of Joint Commission-accredited nursing homes." This proposal
met strong opposition from consumer groups, who feared that it would lead to
a weakening of state and federal efforts to enforce quality of care standards in
37. McCormick, supra note 11, at 8.
38. 42 U.S.C. 1395x(f)(5) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-369, § 2340 1984).
39. Id. § 1396d(a)(16); 42 C.F.R. § 440.140 (1983).
40. 742 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Leone v. Mathews, No. 76-1059 (D.N.J. Aug. 2, 1977)
(finding no unconstitutional delegation to JCAHO of responsibility to certify psychiatric facilities for
Medicare and Medicaid where federal government could certify facilities as distinct parts of hospitals).
41. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2340(a), 98 Stat. 494, 1093 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1395x(f) (1988)); see also Michael J. Astrue, Health Care Reform and the Constitutional Limits
on Private Accreditation as an Alternative to Direct Government Regulation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 75, 79-80 (Autumn 1994).
42. Pub. L. No. 90-174, 81 Stat. 536 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 263a (1988)).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(e) (1988); 42 C.F.R. §§ 493.501-.511 (1992).
44. 47 Fed. Reg. 23,404 (1982) (proposed May 27, 1982).
[Vol. 57: No. 4
MEDICARE AND THE JCAHO
nursing homes. After two congressionally imposed moratoria and congressional
hearings, HHS abandoned its proposal. 5
HHS is permitted to grant Medicare deemed participation status to a wide
variety of accredited institutions' 6 if the Secretary of HHS finds that accredita-
tion by a national body provides reasonable assurances that Medicare
certification conditions are met.47 Regulations to implement this statute were
adopted in November of 1993 and are discussed elsewhere in this symposium. 
4
Under a proposed version of these regulations, on June 30, 1993, the Health
Care Financing Administration ("HCFA")-the body of HHS that administers
Medicare-permitted Joint Commission-accredited home health organizations
to receive deemed status.
49
Though this article is concerned with the relationship between the Joint
Commission and the federal Medicare program, it should be noted that the
states also rely extensively on Joint Commission accreditation in regulating
health care providers. About two-thirds of the states base hospital licensure, in
whole or in part, on Joint Commission accreditation.' States also rely on Joint
Commission accreditation for purposes as varied as defining approved clinical
training for the licensing of professionals51 and specifying institutions whose
services must be covered under insurance mandates. 52 Finally, state courts rely
on Joint Commission accreditation for specifying standards of care in malprac-
tice cases,53 and as evidence of the adequacy of treatment facilities in cases
45. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES 1-2
(1986); Jost, supra note 3, at 844; see also Iris C. Freeman, Blast or Boost? How the Joint Commission
Fared in the Institute of Medicine's Nursing Home Study, QRB, Dec. 1986, at 415.
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The institutions include psychiatric hospitals,
skilled nursing facilities, home health agencies, ambulatory surgical centers, rural health clinics,
comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facilities, hospices, laboratories, and clinics, rehabilitation
agencies, or public health agencies providing outpatient physical therapy, occupational therapy, or
speech pathology services. Id.
47. Id.
48. 58 Fed. Reg. 61,816 (1993) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 401, 488, 489); see Astrue, supra
note 41; Eleanor D. Kinney, Private Accreditation as a Substitute for Direct Government Regulation in
Public Health Insurance Programs: When is it Appropriate?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (Autumn
1994).
49. 58 Fed. Reg. 35,007 (1993); see also GAO, HOME HEALTH CARE: HCFA PROPERLY
EVALUATED JCAHO'S ABILITY TO SURVEY HOME HEALTH AGENCIES (Oct. 26, 1992) (reviewing
HCFA's review of this application).
50. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.20.080(a) (1993) (hospitals); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-3(b) (1991)
(health facilities); IOWA CODE ANN. § 135J.2 (West Supp. 1994) (hospices); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-
GEN. § 8-403(d)(1) (1994) (alcohol and drug abuse treatment programs); MD. CODE ANN., MENTAL
HYGIENE § 504(d)(1) (mental health facilities); Mo. REV. STAT. § 630.705.3(3), (6) (1988) (mental
hospitals); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-138(g)(i) (1991) (home health agencies); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3727.02(A) (Baldwin 1992) (hospitals).
51. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2089.5(e)(3) (West 1990) (physicians); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-12 to 30.5-7 (Burns 1991) (physicians).
52. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 393-7(c)(6)(C) (Michie 1993) (detoxification); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 304.18-140(2) (Baldwin 1992) (detoxification); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 608.156(4)(b) (Michie
1992) (drug and alcohol benefits).
53. See, e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1382-83 (Alaska 1987); Shilkret v. Annapolis
Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 349 A.2d 245, 254 (Md. 1975); Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d. 166, 171 (Wash.
1984).
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alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement in prisons or mentalinstitutions.'4
IV
WHY DOES THE MEDICARE PROGRAM DEPEND ON JOINT COMMISSION
ACCREDITATION FOR ASSURING THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS?
The quality of medical care provided to Medicare beneficiaries should be a
major concern of Congress and of HHS. It is widely believed that health care
consumers lack the ability to evaluate important aspects of the quality of
medical care.55 Older and sicker patients, who consume the vast majority of
Medicare-financed care, may be even less capable than younger and healthier
patients of evaluating the quality of institutional care in making purchasing
decisions. Even informed patients may have little or no choice among health
care institutions if they live in rural or other medically underserved areas, or are
hospitalized in an emergency. Finally, regardless of its responsibilities to its
beneficiaries, Medicare arguably has an independent obligation to taxpayers to
assure that the $156 billion it spends annually funds care of adequate quality.
Given the importance of assuring the quality of Medicare-financed
institutional health care, it is remarkable that throughout its existence Medicare
has depended on a private organization to fulfill this function. Perhaps of
greater concern is the fact that the federal government has, for a time almost
totally, relied on an organization sponsored by medical care providers to
determine institutional quality. The Medicare mechanism for quality control,
therefore, depends upon what appears to be self-regulation of the health care
industry.
A complete explanation of Medicare's reliance on Joint Commission
accreditation status must address three questions. First, why did Congress, at
the outset of Medicare, adopt Joint Commission accreditation as the primary
criterion for determining the quality of hospitals? Second, why has Congress
continued to rely on the Joint Commission for determining Medicare participa-
tion status instead of using alternative regulatory entities such as state survey
agencies or Medicare peer review organizations? Third, why has the federal
government (more specifically HCFA) not undertaken the task of determining
54. See, e.g., Woe v. Cuomo, 729 F.2d 96, 106 (2d Cir. 1984); Concerned Citizens for Creedmoor
Inc. v. Cuomo, 570 F. Supp. 575, 576-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
55. See 1 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICARE: A STRATEGY FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE 35
(Kathleen N. Lohr ed., 1990); 1 AVEDIS DONABEDIAN, EXPLORATIONS IN QUALITY ASSESSMENT AND
MONITORING THE DEFINITION OF QUALITY AND APPROACHES TO ITS ASSESSMENT 5 (1980); Timothy
Stoltzfus Jost, The Necessary and Proper Role of Regulation to Assure the Quality of Health Care, 25
Hous. L. REv. 525, 558-68 (1988); see also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health System Reform: Forward or
Backward in Quality Oversight?, 271 JAMA 1508 (1994) (criticizing recent proposals to correct
information problems through quality report cards).
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Medicare participation status for health care institutions? These questions will
be addressed seriatim.
A. The Origins of Deemed Status
The creation of the Medicare program was an important milestone in the
long and hard-fought battle for national health insurance.56  Organized
medicine had vigorously opposed the adoption of such a program. 7 President
Lyndon Johnson, with considerable assistance at the last minute from Wilbur
Mills, the powerful chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, was able
to force the program through a Congress heavily controlled by Democrats. 5
Having won the legislative battle, however, the architects of Medicare faced
almost certain failure in implementing the program unless they could rapidly
bring health care providers, including physicians, to embrace it. 9 The program
drafters' primary, indeed nearly all-absorbing, goal was to increase the elderly's
access to health care services.' Goals of controlling program costs came in
second, with assuring quality health care a distant third.61 With respect to the
access criterion, the success or failure of Medicare turned on whether enough
health care professionals and institutions would participate in the program to
make it viable.
To increase the likelihood of professional and institutional participation,
Medicare was designed to mimic conventional health insurance programs, to
which health care providers were, by the mid-1960s, quite accustomed. 62 It
reimbursed providers for their costs in supplying services to Medicare beneficia-
ries, much like existing Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans.63 Physician
reimbursement was charge-based, and physicians had the option of billing their
patients directly (with the patients then being indemnified by Medicare for a
portion of the charge) or billing Medicare directly on an assignment basis.'
Medicare was even administered through private insurance companies, which
spared professionals and providers the indignity of dealing with the federal
government.65
56. See PETER A. CORNING, THE EVOLUTION OF MEDICARE FROM IDEA TO LAW (1969);
RICHARD HARRIS, A SACRED TRUST (1966); THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE
(1973).
57. See generally HARRIS, supra note 56.
58. See id. at 162-92; MARMOR, supra note 56, at 59-81.
59. JUDITH M. FEDER, MEDICARE: THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE 11 (1977);
MARMOR, supra note 56, at 83-84; JAMES A. MARONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH: POPULAR
PARTICIPATION AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 263-64 (1990); David Blumenthal,
Medicare: The Beginnings, in RENEWING THE PROMISE 3, 17 (David Blumenthal et al. eds., 1988).
60. MARMOR, supra note 56, at 79.
61. FRANK J. THOMPSON, HEALTH POLICY AND THE BUREAUCRACY 176-77 (1981).
62. See Blumenthal, supra note 59, at 13, 14; MARMOR, supra note 56, at 78, 80.
63. MARONE, supra note 59, at 263; Thompson, supra note 19 at 157; see ERWIN WITKIN, THE
IMPACT OF MEDICARE 64 (1971).
64. MARMOR, supra note 56, at 80; Thompson, supra note 19, at 158.
65. ROBERT J. MYERS, MEDICARE 175 (1970). The use of carriers and intermediaries also spared
the federal government from having to develop its own payment infrastructure and allowed it to build
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Central to this access-expansion strategy was the noninterference principle,
still enshrined in Section One of Title XVIII of the Medicare statute:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee
to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the-manner in
which medical services are provided .. or to exercise any supervision or control over
the administration or operation of any ... institution, agency, or person [providing
health services].'
Under this principle, federal regulation of providers was to be minimal.
Utilization of hospital services was to be reviewed, but the statute delegated
responsibility for carrying out this function to the hospitals themselves.67
Nonaccredited hospitals and "extended care facilities" required certification to
participate in Medicare,' but the federal government relied on state agencies
for this certification, eschewing the creation of an independent federal
bureaucracy to oversee health care.69 The primary relationship in the
Medicare program was between the program and its beneficiaries, who enrolled
in the program, paid their premiums, and either assigned their right to payment
for specific medical services to their physicians or sought indemnification for
bills they paid themselves.7 °
It was in this context that deemed Medicare certification status for Joint
Commission-accredited hospitals was conceived. A program had to be devised
that would assure that the vast majority of the nation's hospitals would be
willing and able to participate almost immediately, making hospital services
readily available to the elderly regardless of where they lived.71 The short
period of time over which the program was to be implemented-less than a
year-and the nonintervention policy just discussed militated against the
creation of a massive federal bureaucracy to regulate hospitals.' Nevertheless,
some mechanism was necessary to determine whether participating institutional
providers were in fact what they purported to be and to assure minimum
quality.
Reliance on Joint Commission accreditation for determining Medicare
participation status seemed an ideal solution. Most large hospitals in the nation
were already Joint Commission-accredited, and Joint Commission accreditation
on the experience of existing insurance organizations.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988).
67. WITKIN, supra note 63, at 117-26; Thompson, supra note 19, at 157-58.
68. See John W. Cashman & Beverlee A. Meyers, Medicare: Standards of Service in a New
Program-Licensure, Certification, Accreditation, 57 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1107 (1967); Worthington &
Silver, supra note 23, at 310-17.
69. MYERS, supra note 65, at 177-78.
70. This program stance was, it should be noted, readily accepted by the Social Security
Administration ("the SSA"), which at the outset administered the Medicare program. The SSA has
traditionally been a bill-paying agency, and had little interest in becoming a regulatory agency. See
Judith M. Feder, The Social Security Administration and Medicare: A Strategy of Implementation, in
TOWARD A NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY 19 (Kenneth M. Friedman & Stuart H. Rakoff eds., 1977).
71. FEDER, supra note 59, at 11.
72. Id. at 11; McGeary, supra note 17, at 302, 303.
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was generally recognized as a symbol of acceptable hospital quality.73 Because
health care professionals and providers controlled the Joint Commission,
providers viewed oversight by the Joint Commission as more acceptable than
direct federal regulation.74 Therefore, the original Medicare statute, discussed
above, not only accepted Joint Commission accreditation as "deemed status" for
program certification (thus obviating the creation of a federal program), but also
prohibited the federal government from imposing additional requirements on
hospitals beyond those imposed by the Joint Commission75 (thus satisfying the
noninterference principle).
B. Why Has Medicare Continued to Rely on Joint Commission Accreditation
In Lieu of Alternative Regulatory Approaches?
While the peculiar circumstances that attended the origins of Medicare
explain how deemed status came to be, they do not explain its durability. The
Medicare implementation strategy discussed above in fact worked. A boycott
threatened by physicians fizzled, and by July 1, 1966, when Medicare became
operational, an ample supply of providers and professionals was available to
accept Medicare beneficiaries as patients.7 6  The faults of this hands-off
strategy quickly became apparent, however.' By 1970, when Law and
Contemporary Problems published a two-volume symposium on health policy,7'
problems of overutilization, poor quality care, and program and patient fraud
and abuse were fully evident.
Over the last two decades, Congress and HHS have continued to expand the
federal regulatory response to these problems. As this has occurred, the nature
of the Medicare program has changed gradually yet dramatically. Though the
noninterference principle enshrined in section 18017" has never been repealed,
it exists today only as an anachronism. Medicare has ceased to function as an
indemnity insurer that pays for services purchased by its beneficiaries. Rather
it has itself become a purchaser of services, immersed in regulating the
professionals and providers whom it pays to deliver services to its beneficiaries.
For example, at the outset of the program, many physicians billed Medicare
beneficiaries directly for services at any rate they chose, with the beneficiary in
turn seeking indemnification from Medicare, often at a lower rate. Accepting
"assignment" of a claim from the patient as payment in full and billing Medicare
73. FEDER, supra note 59, at 7-9; Jost, supra note 3, at 854.
74. Jost, supra note 3, at 854; Telephone Interview with Wilbur Cohen, former Assistant Secretary
of HEW for legislation, 1961-1965, former Undersecretary of HEW, 1965-1967, former Secretary of
HEW, 1968-1969 (Aug. 30, 1982).
75. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
76. HARRIS, supra note 56, at 215-18; MARONE, supra note 59, at 264; Cashman & Meyers, supra
note 68, at 1114; Thompson, supra note 19, at 161-62.
77. MARMOR, supra note 56, at 85-93, 122-23.
78. See Symposium, Health Care, 35 LAw & CONTEM. PROBS. (Spring & Autumn 1970), and, in
particular, Irwin Wolkstein, Medicare 1971: Changing Attitudes and Changing Legislation, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 697 (Autumn 1970).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988).
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directly was an alternative available for physicians who wanted to make sure
that they received payment, but Medicare had not pressed this as the favored
alternative. Though physicians can still bill patients directly today, Congress has
steadily moved to discourage this behavior. In 1983, Congress established
various incentives to encourage physicians to become "participating providers"
who accept assignment of all claims. Then in 1986, it imposed Maximum
Allowable Actual Charge limits on nonparticipating physicians. Finally, the
physician payment reforms of 1989 limited to an even greater extent the ability
of resistant physicians to bill for the balance of nonassigned claims.'
The Medicare Utilization and Quality Peer Review Organizations ("PROs")
are a second example of the Medicare/provider regulatory relationship. PROs,
which regulate the utilization and quality of Medicare-financed services, have
little contact with beneficiaries, dealing instead directly with providers. PROs
review provider claims, determining whether claimed services were medically
necessary, of acceptable quality, and provided in an appropriate setting. If a
PRO decides to deny payment for services, it is the provider rather than the
patient who must, in most instances, bear the cost of the denied services.8,
As Medicare has transformed into a purchaser and regulator, however, HHS
has remained remarkably faithful to the narrowest interpretation of its initial
nonintervention promise by eschewing any significant direct regulatory role.
HHS has chosen, rather, to carry out its manifold regulatory functions indirectly
through the states and private regulators. Like many other federal regulatory
programs that have emerged in recent decades, Medicare has often attempted
to use preexisting state regulatory programs for its own purposes.' In some
instances, this has simply meant that Medicare has relied on preexisting state
regulatory programs for its own purposes, as it did when it required state
licensure as a condition of physician reimbursement.' In other situations, the
federal government has funded state programs that supplement parallel federal
efforts, as is true with fraud and abuse programs.8" In still other instances,
where HHS operates its own regulatory programs, it has accepted parallel state
regulation of providers as an alternative if, and only if, the state program meets
stringent federal requirements, as is true with clinical laboratories.' In some
cases, Medicare has contracted with the states to carry out federal regulatory
responsibilities, as it does when the states validate Joint Commission accredita-
80. PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (1991); John
Holahan & Stephen Zuckerman, Medicare Mandatory Assignment: An Unnecessary Risk, HEALTH
AFFAIRS, Spring 1989, at 65, 66-67.
81. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Policing Cost Containment: The Medicare Peer Review Organization
Program, 14 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 483, 511-12 (1991).
82. Precedents for reliance on state agencies in social insurance programs existed at the time
Medicare was established, including the use of state agencies for determining disability for the social
security disability program. MYERS, supra note 65, at 173.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(r) (1988).
84. See id. § 1396b(a)(6), (q) (establishing federal funding for state Medicaid fraud and abuse units).
85. 42 C.F.R. § 493.513(a)(1) (1992).
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tion.' Finally, Medicare has in some cases directly and aggressively intervened
to reshape a preexisting state regulatory program, as it did with nursing home
regulation.'
Medicare has also relied on a variety of forms of private regulation. In a
few instances, this has involved industry self-regulation. Joint Commission
accreditation is one example of this, as is Medicare's requirement that hospitals
conduct internal utilization reviews.' More often, Medicare has relied on
private entities other than providers for regulation. Medicare carriers and
intermediaries, private insurers or data processors, are delegated regulatory
responsibility for policing the necessity and appropriateness of Medicare-
financed services.8 9 Medicare has also created specialized private (or quasi-
public) regulatory bodies, the Medicare Peer Review Organizations, and then
contracted with them to carry out specific PRO regulatory programs.90
Why has HHS rejected the options of state regulation or of creating
independent, purpose-made private entities for regulating hospitals, choosing
rather to continue to rely on industry self-regulation through-the Joint Commis-
sion? First, Medicare's most favored alternative, reliance on state regulation,
was not viable at the time of Medicare's creation in the mid-1960s, when state
hospital licensure programs, most of which had been established in the
preceding two decades, were weak and ineffectual.9' Staffing levels were low,
and enforcement was sporadic.' Though some state hospital licensure
programs have improved over the years, reliance on state licensure today would
merely constitute a less direct form of reliance on the Joint Commission,
because so many states still rely heavily on the Joint Commission for determin-
ing licensure status.93
The PRO program could perhaps have taken the place of Joint Commission
accreditation as Medicare's instrument for hospital regulation. Since its
inception, however, the PRO program, like its predecessor the Professional
Standards Review Organization ("PSRO") program,' has focused principally
on individual patient encounters with the health care system rather than on
institutions from a more global perspective. This is undoubtedly because the
initial emphasis of the PSRO program, out of which the PRO program grew,
was on utilization review, and utilization review in the United States has
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1395aa(c) (1988); 42 C.F.R. § 488.6 (1992).
87. See Timothy S. Jost, Legal Characteristics of the Extended Care Facility, in HEALTHCARE
FACILMES LAW 993, 1006-17 (Anne M. Dellinger ed., 1991).
88. WTKIN, supra note 63, at 117-26.
89. 42 C.F.R. §§ 421.100, 421.200 (1992).
90. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c to 1320c-13 (1988).
91. HILARY G. FRY, THE OPERATION OF STATE HOSPITAL PLANNING AND LICENSURE PROGRAMS
23-47 (1965); Milton I. Roemer, Controlling and Promoting Quality in Medical Care, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 284, 290 (Spring 1970); Worthington & Silver, supra note 23, at 308-10.
92. FRY, supra note 91, at 38, 43-46.
93. See supra note 16.
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-1 (1988).
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historically focused on individual cases.95 In this tradition, PROs have
reviewed care on a case-by-case basis, subjecting cases to generic quality and
discharge screens and scrutinizing only the individual cases selected by these
screens for professional review.96 PROs have generally not looked at the
structural characteristics of hospitals and, until recently, rarely looked at process
and outcome issues from an institution-wide perspective.
Very recently, the work of PROs and of the Joint Commission has begun to
converge; PROs have begun to move under the Fourth Scope of Work (the
document that defines PRO responsibilities for the three-year contract period
beginning in 1993) 9 toward analysis of patterns of medical care based on the
Uniform Clinical Data Set,98 and the Joint Commission has focused more on
process and outcome issues under the Agenda for Change." Nevertheless, the
two programs still remain largely complementary rather than redundant.
Absent a major transformation and a significant increase in funding, PROs
could not take over the function of the Joint Commission in certifying industry-
wide compliance with Medicare participation conditions.
C. Why Has HHS Not Taken Over Hospital Regulation Itself?
Even though no suitable external alternative to the Joint Commission has
existed, HHS, or more specifically HCFA, could itself have taken over surveying
hospitals for compliance with Medicare conditions of participation and made
hospital participation in Medicare dependent on the result of its own surveys.
Why has this not happened?
First, and most important, is the cost to HCFA of administering such a
program. In 1991, HCFA estimated that it would cost $59 million and require
722 additional full-time employees for it to assume responsibility for surveying
all hospitals (including those currently granted deemed status) for Medicare
compliance."X° This would require increasing the size of HCFA by almost a
third, as HCFA currently has a total of 1175 employees in the central office and
1049 in the regional offices administering the entire Medicare program.1"1
HCFA currently has only five central office employees and a handful' of
additional regional office staff managing the Medicare hospital certification
95. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Administrative Law Issues Involving the Medicare Utilization and
Quality Peer Review Organization (PRO) Program: Analysis and Recommendations, 50 OHIO ST. L.
1, 4-5 (1989).
96. Id. at 34-35.
97. See A Welcome Move Toward PRO Reform, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 16, 1992, at 29.
98. The Uniform Clinical Data Set is a computerized database which contains information about
conditions and treatments from the medical records of about one million patients per year. Stephen
F. Jencks & Gail R. Wilensky, The Health Care Quality Initiative: A New Approach to Quality
Assurance in Medicare, 268 JAMA 900, 900-01 (1992).
99. See id. at 901-03 (discussing the new directions in which the PRO program is going).
100. GAO, MONITORING, supra note 36, at 25.
101. Telephone Interview with Sharon Goldburn, Personnel Managment Specialist, HCFA (May 19,
1993).
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program."m In particular, HCFA would have to hire, train, and maintain a
staff of costly professionals, including physicians, nurses, and attorneys, to
formulate and enforce program standards. Under Medicare amendments
adopted in 1990 that bar user fees for survey and certification purposes, HCFA
would have to absorb all of these costs itself. 3
Of course, the present Joint Commission surveys are themselves quite
expensive. 104  Medicare bears part of this cost because its payments to
hospitals are still loosely based on historic aggregate hospital expenditures,
which include accreditation costs.1 5 However, since Medicare currently pays
for only about twenty-seven percent of the cost of hospital care,'06 most of the
cost of Joint Commission certification is borne by other payers. Moreover,
because many states rely on Joint Commission certification for licensure and
because hospitals may well seek the cachet of Joint Commission accreditation
regardless of regulatory requirements, it is likely that hospitals would continue
to pay for Joint Commission accreditation and to pass this cost on in part to
Medicare regardless of any independent regulatory program HCFA might
establish. Finally, it is arguable that the Joint Commission provides survey and
certification services at a lower cost than HCFA could. To the extent, for
example, that the Joint Commission can draw on the expertise of its member
groups for assistance in formulating and interpreting standards, it may avoid
some costs that HCFA would incur in operating a regulatory program.1°7
More than any other factor, the practical consideration of cost explains why
Congress and HCFA have been content to rely on the Joint Commission
102. Hospital Accreditation and Compliance with Medicare's Conditions of Participation: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Congress, 2d Sess. 13
(1990) (statement of David P. Baine) [hereinafter Hearings]; id. at 25 (statement of Thomas Morford,
Director, Health Standards and Quality Bureau).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1395aa(e) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
104. Laura Greanias, Hospitals Find Probation by JCAHO Not as Bad as they had Imagined, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, July 1, 1991, at 26, 27 (basic, initial survey fee for a triennial survey in 1991 was $6,052,
but survey of a large university hospital might cost as much as $40,000 to $45,000"because of additional
services to be surveyed); Survey Fees to Cover Accreditation Process Costs, JOINT COMMISSION
PERSPECrIVES, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 6 (base fee for 1993 is $6,675). This is, of course, just the cost of the
survey. The total costs of survey preparation are much higher. One hospital estimated its costs at
$326,784. Don A. Rockwell, The Cost of Accreditation: One Hospital's Experience, HosP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY, Feb. 1993, at 151. Another hospital recently estimated that it spends about
$118,000 a year to maintain JCAHO accreditation. David Burda, Hospital Exec Appeals to JCAHO
to Consider Costs, MOD. HEALTHCARE, May 23, 1994, at 12.
105. See TERRY S. COLEMAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICARE & MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT 28-34
(1990).
106. Katherine R. Levit et al., National Health Expenditures, 1990, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV.,
Fall 1991, at 29, 52.
107. See infra text accompanying note 164 (discussing the Joint Commission's use of its Professional
Technical Advisory Committees in standards setting). On the other hand, it is arguable that current
JCAHO survey costs are ultimately passed on to consumers, who must also as taxpayers finance
independent HCFA surveys; thus, society as a whole would save money by transferring the entire cost
to the federal government. STIEBER & WOLFE, supra note 16, at 27-29. Whether in fact the total cost
of certification would be less if the federal government took over this function remains an empirical
question, the answer to which depends on how much a federal certification program would cost and
whether hospitals would drop Joint Commission accreditation if such a program existed.
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hospital accreditation program and why they have not developed their own
hospital survey and certification program. A second reason, however, might
offer a further explanation: the Joint Commission is better able than HCFA to
adapt its standards to incorporate the rapidly developing technology of health
care quality assessment and improvement.1 m
HCFA does in fact, as noted earlier, have its own conditions for hospital
participation."° The first iteration of these standards, created in 1966 at the
time Medicare was established, was based on the then-existing JCAHO
standards and considered structural aspects of quality almost exclusively."
In 1977, HCFA undertook to update these standards.1 ' Draft regulations
were published in 1980,2 and again in 1983, after a change of administra-
tion.113  HCFA published final regulations in 198614 and has not revisited
them since.
As evidenced by this history, updating federal provider conditions of
participation has been a difficult and very time-consuming process. Not only is
HCFA subject to the notice and comment constraints of the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"),"5 but it has also in recent years been subject to close
and prolonged scrutiny from the Office of Management and Budget.11 6 When
in the related area of nursing home regulation HCFA tried to gain flexibility not
available under the APA by proposing broad standards as rules to be enforced
through unpublished survey guidelines, 17 its position was decisively rejected
108. The advantage that private standard-setting bodies enjoy over public ones in the areas of
flexibility and responsiveness has been noted in other areas. Cheit notes that
[p]rivate standards-setting is prospective and ongoing, while public efforts tend to be corrective
and singular. Private standards-setters tend to intervene relatively early in the life cycle of an
issue, adjusting the subsequent standards over time. Public standards-setters, by contrast, are
likely to get involved later in time, often after a major disaster, and to adopt a "one-shot"
standard that is not later revised.
Ross E. CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS
19, 202-05 (1990); see also DOUGLAS C. MICHAEL, FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF AUDITED SELF-
REGULATION AS A REGULATORY TECHNIQUE 10-12 (1993) (Preliminary Draft for the Administrative
Conference of the United States) (to be published in 47 ADMIN. L. REV., No. 2 (1995)) (discussing the
advantages of flexibility that attend self-regulation).
109. 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.1-.66 (1993).
110. McGeary, supra note 17, at 301-04, 311.
111. Id. at 309.
112. 45 Fed. Reg. 41,794 (1980); see McGeary, supra note 17, at 310.
113. 48 Fed. Reg. 299 (1983); see McGeary, supra note 17, at 310. The second draft was rewritten
to reflect JCAHO accreditation standards.
114. 51 Fed. Reg. 22,010 (1986) (codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.1-.66) (1992).
115. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
116. For example, the OMB tied up proposed rules implementing nursing home reform legislation
for more than a year, and then only released the rules under pressure from consumer groups and
congressional leadership. Enforcement Rules Published, QUALITY CARE ADVOCATE, July-Aug. 1992,
at 1, 6. On OMB review of agency action generally, see Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of
Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533 (1989). Delay is a general problem affecting
government standards-setting programs. See CHEIT, supra note 108, at 194; JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE
DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCE REGULATION 106-39 (1988); John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of
Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 258-60, 277-81 (1990).
117. 52 Fed. Reg. 24,752 (1987).
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in federal court.'18  By contrast, the Joint Commission amends its standards
annually and is currently undergoing a substantial rethinking of its entire body
of certification standards. As the Director of HCFA's Health Standards and
Quality Bureau acknowledged at a congressional hearing:
[PIrivate sector organizations don't need to issue proposed rules, final rules, et
cetera, to deal with everybody in the country who has a better idea.
They can go and pretty much set standards that are the state of the art.
That is a big encumbrance for the government. We will never match private
sector standards vis-a-vis the state of the art.
That is why deeming in general terms is a fairly good notion." 9
V
Is ACCREDITATION AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO DIRECT
REGULATION?
While considerations of cost-savings and of regulatory flexibility might
explain why HHS has chosen to rely on Joint Commission accreditation for
assuring quality in hospitals, the question remains open whether Joint
Commission accreditation is adequate to protect the public's interest in quality
health care. It is to this question that this article now turns, considering first
theory and then the practical evidence.
A. Theoretical Considerations
In an earlier article, I developed at length a model for understanding the
Joint Commission. 2 ' True self-regulation has been adopted in a number of
industries for a variety of reasons, including forestalling government regulation
and enhancing consumer confidence in products that consumers would otherwise
have difficulty evaluating.121 The Joint Commission is often characterized as
a self-regulatory body, and, insofar as it includes the American Hospital
Association among its members, it can be thought of in this way. Hospitals,
however, do not usually think of the Joint Commission as "their" regulator.
Hospital executives do not view it as a friendly, collegial presence, rather more
commonly as a troublesome external regulator. 2 2 Indeed, surveys of hospital
CEOs in recent years have found them quite critical of the Joint Commis-
sion. 123 In fact, the Joint Commission is better understood historically not as
representing true self-regulation (that is, the hospital industry regulating itself),
118. Estate of Smith v. Bowen, 675 F. Supp. 586, 590 (D. Colo. 1987).
119. Hearings, supra note 102, at 25 (statement of Thomas Morford).
120. Jost, supra note 3, at 860-80.
121. EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 220-23 (1982); CHEIT, supra note 108, at 179-80; Jost, supra note
3, at 868-71.
122. See, e.g., Michael Abramowitz, On the Road with a Hospital Inspector: How Well Does A
Private Agency Survey the Nation's Health Care Centers, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1991, at Z8; Donna
Ojanen Thomas, How to Survive an Accreditation Review, R.N., Apr. 1987, at 17; sources cited infra
notes 154-56.
123. These polls are discussed further infra in the text accompanying notes 154-56.
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but rather as representing what might be called cross-regulation, specifically
regulation of the hospitals by their most immediate consumers-physicians.124
The Joint Commission grew out of the ACS's Hospital Standardization
Program, a clear attempt by surgeons to standardize hospitals, which in the early
twentieth century were far from acceptable as places to practice medicine."
Throughout its history, the majority of the commissioners of the Joint
Commission have been doctors. As evidenced by articles in the medical trade
association press, these commissioners represent the interests of their constitu-
ents as well as promote the mission of the Joint Commission.126 The preroga-
tives of physicians in the governance of hospitals and their control over medical
staff issues are jealously guarded by these members. 27 One would expect the
Joint Commission, as a cross-regulatory program, to be very concerned with
standardizing hospitals to assure their maximum utility to doctors, but to avoid
at all costs closing hospitals and thus putting doctors out of work.
Neither of these models fully explains the behavior of the Joint Commission
in the recent past, however. The Joint Commission has also become,
paradoxically, a creation of the responsibilities that have been delegated to it.
Though participation in the Joint Commission hospital accreditation program
is still in theory voluntary, it would be very difficult for a sizeable hospital to
forgo accreditation. Doing so would not only risk the public calling into
question the quality of the services offered by the hospital, but would also
endanger the hospital's federal Medicare status and, in many states, the
hospital's licensure. The power, wealth, and status of the Joint Commission are
dependent, therefore, upon its continued recognition by the public in general
and the federal and state government in particular as an acceptable regulator.
The Joint Commission has thus increasingly come to resemble other private
standard-setters, which pursue their own interests as guarantors of quality to
some extent independent of the more narrow interests of their sponsoring
organizations. 128
124. See Jost, supra note 3, at 865-69; see also DAVID HEMENWAY, INDUSTRY-WIDE VOLUNTARY
PRODUCT STANDARDS 63-68, 74-76 (1975) (offering examples of cross-regulation in other industries).
125. Jost, supra note 3, at 845-49; Carl P. Schlicke, American Surgery's Noblest Experiment, 106
ARCHIVES SURGERY 379, 379-80 (1973).
126. See Brian McCormick, Trustees Reverse Stance on Joint Commission Participation, 34 AM. MED.
NEWS, Dec. 23/30, 1991, at 4-5 [hereinafter McCormick, Trustees] (AMA House of Delegates criticizes
Joint Commission's quality initiatives and questions whether AMA should continue to participate in
Joint Commission); Brian McCormick, HMSS Tackles Practice Parameters, Joint Commission, 34 AM.
MED. NEWS, July 8, 1991 at 17 (AMA Joint Commission members champion AMA Hospital Medical
Staff Section's position on protecting medical staff autonomy) [hereinafter McCormick, HMSS].
127. See McCormick, Trustees, supra note 126; McCormick, HMSS, supra note 126; Brian
McCormick, House Backs Continued Practice Parameter Role, 33 AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 14, 1990, at
8.
128. See CHEIT, supra note 108, at 16, 176-87 (noting that in other arenas private standard-setters
are able to pursue a more independent course where they receive government support or recognition).
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The Joint Commission's recently adopted policy of performing unannounced
inspections on five percent of accredited facilities annually129 can best be
understood under this independent regulator model. This policy enhances the
Joint Commission's legitimacy as a regulator but runs counter to the interests
of its accredited institutions, which would undoubtedly prefer announced
inspections that allow them to showcase their institutions."
Finally, the Joint Commission seems to be positioning itself to assume still
another role. The Joint Commission has recently established a program for
accrediting health care provider networks.' It has also committed itself to
modify its information disclosure policy so as to provide consumers with
substantially more information regarding accredited institutions.132 The Joint
Commission obviously seems to be preparing itself for a reformed health care
system based on competition among health care networks.3 3  In such a
system, consumers will badly need information regarding the comparative
quality of both health care institutions and health care networks. If the Joint
Commission can establish itself as a credible source of such information, it may
in the future find that its primary customers are not the institutions it accredits,
the doctors who work in those institutions, or the government, but rather the
consumers of health care and their institutional agents (such as health alliances).
Under these circumstances, the Joint Commission could become an agent and
adviser of purchasers.
Under any of these models, the Joint Commission could be expected, for
varying reasons, to make some contribution toward assuring the quality of care
in hospitals. In its self-regulatory role, it could be expected to pursue a strategy
of creating and enforcing standards sufficiently stringent to maintain consumer
confidence and forestall further regulatory intervention, making a special effort
to deal aggressively with hospitals in which conditions are bad enough to give
the whole industry a bad name."3 On the other hand, if it were merely a self-
regulator, the Joint Commission would be unlikely to provide information to
129. See Dennis S. O'Leary, Unannounced Surveys: A Positive Force, JOINT COMMISSION
PERSPECTIVES, Jan./Feb. 1993, at 2.
130. See Linda Oberman, supra note 1, at 6.
131. See JOINT COMMISSION STANDARDS, supra note 10.
132. See Linda Oberman, Top Accreditor Goes Public on New Hospital Report Cards, AM. MED.
NEWS, Oct. 10, 1994, at 3; Andrew Skolnick, Joint Commission Will Collect, Publicize Outcomes, 270
JAMA 165 (1993); see also Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs., Joint Commission
Prepares for Release of Organization-Specific Performance Data: Expands Policy on Falsification of
Information, May 17, 1993 (news release, copy on file with author); Mary T. Koska, JCAHO Gets
Lukewarm Reviews From its CEO Opinion Survey, 64 HOSPITALS, May 5, 1990, at 49.
133. See Consumer Issues: Hearings on Health Care Reform (Part 4) Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (statement of Dennis S. O'Leary, President, Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations).
134. See Abramowitz, supra note 122, at Z8 (quoting a Joint Commission inspector as stating, "The
only response we have to the people who want to take over the medical system may be to prove that
we are monitoring ourselves"); see also Charles D. Bankhead, Time is Running Out on Self-Policing
Quality of Care: With Regulatory Groups Waiting in the Wings, the Medical Profession Can't Afford to
Drag its Heels, MED. WORLD NEWS, May 9, 1988, at 32.
Page 15: Autumn 1994]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
consumers regarding quality differences among accredited institutions or to
enforce standards rigorously against institutions in which quality lapses were not
sufficiently serious to cause public scandal.135
As a cross-regulatory body, protecting the interests of physicians within
hospitals, the Joint Commission could be trusted to assure that the structure,
equipment, and staffing of hospitals are optimal for facilitating the work of
physicians.'36 To the extent patients are primarily dependent on physician
care within hospitals, the Joint Commission would protect the interests of
patients.137 Insofar as patients could benefit from nonphysician care within
hospitals, however, the Joint Commission could play an anticompetitive role that
would run counter to the patient's interest.138
As an independent private regulator, the Joint Commission could be
expected to respond to political pressure for an enhanced regulatory presence
and to rapidly incorporate technical and professional developments in quality
assessment, assurance, and improvement. It could be expected to develop its
own culture and commitment to quality assurance, to some extent independent
of the interests of its member organizations. 3 9
Finally, as a consultant to purchasers, the fortunes of the Joint Commission
turn on its ability to provide trustworthy information regarding health care
institutions and networks. It could be expected to devote itself to developing
and implementing reliable instruments for assessing quality.
All four roles of the Joint Commission are consistent with its Agenda for
Change, which represents a significant attempt to enhance the ability of
hospitals to assess and improve quality. The Joint Commission's Agenda for
135. See Koska, supra note 132, at 46 (reporting that hospital CEOs are concerned about hospital-
specific data releases by Joint Commission). Cheit notes that private standards-testers may be able to
push firms marketing products below generally accepted standards to improve their performance, but
must follow the average firms in the determination of what is generally acceptable. CHEIT, supra note
108, at 183.
136. See Emily Friedman, Accreditation Redesign Evolving, 30 MED. WORLD NEWS, June 26, 1989,
at 24 (citing difficulty Joint Commission had rewriting its standards because of "turf" issues). "Dr.
O'Leary [the president of the Joint Commission] thinks that many existing Joint Commission standards
involve 'guild issues' that are dear to health care professionals but not necessarily relevant to the quality
of care." Id. at 35. The classic example of such issues is that of the independence of the medical staff
and their role in governance of hospitals.
137. Cheit notes that in other private standard setting contexts other advocates of consumer interests
emerge, such as insurers or vendors of safety or pollution control equipment. CHErr, supra note 108,
at 177.
138. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 648-51 (1988); Jost, supra note
3, at 908-10; Brian McCormick, Nurses Vow to Fight On for Joint Commission Representation, AM.
MED. NEWS, Nov. 2, 1990, at 5 (American Nursing Association denied position on Joint Commission
Board).
139. See McCormick, Trustees, supra note 126; McCormick, HMSS, supra note 126 (AMA
Commissioners voted down by other commissioners on some AMA positions, but working together with
others to promote those positions); Brian McCormick, AMA Not Ready for New Quality Philosophy,
34 AM. MED. NEWS July 22, 1991, at 5 (AMA Delegate resolutions question JCAHO quality initiatives
and urge protection of physician prerogatives in hospitals); see also CHEIT supra note 108, at 16, 178-79;
JOSEPH V. REES, REFORMING THE WORKPLACE 103-05, 226-27 (1988) (noting similar phenomena in
other regulatory settings).
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Change also makes sense if placed in the context of the wider federal health
policy debate. In recent years, it has become clear that the U.S. health care
system has failed miserably in terms of making affordable health care
universally available. By measures of cost and access, the U.S. health care
system compares poorly to the systems of all other industrialized nations."
This leaves both health care professionals and institutional providers with one
argument, in fact heard repeatedly, "We have the best health care in the
world., 141 To the extent that the Joint Commission adds credence to this
argument by keeping at the forefront of innovation in defining, measuring, and
improving quality, it advances the cause of the entire U.S. health care
industry.142
The Joint Commission's recent emphasis on continuous quality improvement
makes it possible for it to pursue quality aggressively without threatening
providers or physicians. The continuous quality improvement strategy
emphasizes the internal identification and solution of problems rather than the
external enforcement of standards; the improvement of processes rather than
the elimination of problem personnel; and incentives rather than sanctions. The
strategy is thus a much more acceptable form of quality improvement than
traditional inspection and sanction strategies. 43 To the extent the continuous
quality improvement strategy is effective, the Agenda for Change bodes well for
consumers as well as for the industry.
B. Evidence of the Joint Commission's Performance
There is remarkably little evidence as to whether Joint Commission
accreditation in fact assures the quality of hospital care. Few studies exist
correlating Joint Commission accreditation status with other measures of
hospital quality. One study of state psychiatric hospitals that compared
accreditation status with characteristics described as quality of care indicators
found that median values for these measures were higher in accredited than in
nonaccredited hospitals.14' Another study, however, has failed to find
statistically significant relationships between Joint Commission accreditation
140. See Robert G. Evans, Tension, Compression and Shear: Directions, Stresses and Outcomes of
Health Care Cost Control, 15 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 101 (1990).
141. See, e.g., James S. Todd et al., Health Access America: Strengthening the U.S. Health Care
System, 265 JAMA 2503, 2503 (1991) (outlining the AMA's health reform plan and stating in
introduction: "We have become the premier nation in providing high-quality, comprehensive medical
care and education.").
142. See Abramowitz, supra note 122, at Z8 (quoting Joint Commission president Dennis O'Leary
as stating: "We're not going to solve the problem of spiraling health care costs. But purchasers of
health care will know in the future what they're buying. They'll know what they're getting in value.").
143. See DONALD M. BERWICK ET AL., CURING HEALTH CARE: NEW STRATEGIES FOR QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT (1990); Donald M. Berwick, Continuous Improvement as an Ideal in Health Care, 320
NEW ENG. J. MED. .53 (1989); Stephen B. Kritchevsky & Bryan P. Simmons, Continuous Quality
Improvement: Concepts and Applications for Physician Care, 266 JAMA 1817 (1991).
144. Martin C. McGurrin & Trevor R. Hadley, Quality of Care and Accreditation Status of State
Psychiatric Hospitals, 42 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1060, 1061 (1991).
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status and hospital mortality information published by HCFA.14' Finally, the
Harvard Medical Practice study, reviewing a weighted random sample of 43,429
medical records from fifty-one randomly selected New York hospitals, failed to
find a significant correlation between the number of deficiencies found to
require corrective action by Joint Commission surveys from 1984 and 1986 and
the rate of adverse events or the rate of negligently caused adverse events found
in the hospitals in 1984.146 The study also failed to find a correlation between
the rate of JCAHO-identified deficiencies and either a risk-adjusted patient
mortality index or a risk-adjusted thirty-day unexpected patient readmission
index. 147 None of these studies is definitive.
In the absence of empirical research, other measures of performance can be
considered. One such measure is the evaluation of Joint Commission accredita-
tion by its various constituencies. Consumer groups and journalists have often
criticized the deemed status program, usually citing anecdotal situations in which
the Joint Commission granted accreditation to hospitals in which truly dreadful
conditions existed.1" The most widely publicized of such critiques was an
article by Walt Bogdanich in the Wall Street Journal in 1988.49 The fact that
historically so few hospitals have lost accreditation status is customarily cited by
such critiques as demonstrating the ineffectiveness of Joint Commission
accreditation.1 50 Some consumer groups, moreover, consider industry self-
regulation to be inherently unacceptable, whatever its results."'
Accredited hospitals are also not wholly satisfied with the Commission's
performance. In 1990 and 1991 surveys, hospital CEOs expressed concern
regarding vague and inconsistently interpreted standards, unqualified or
145. William F. Jessee & Catherine M. Schranz, Medicare Mortality Rates and Hospital Quality: Are
They Related?, 2 QUALITY ASSURANCE IN HEALTH CARE 137 (1990). This study may, of course,
indicate either that HCFA's mortality data or Joint Commission accreditation, or both, are faulty as
measures of quality. See also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, THE QUALITY
OF MEDICAL CARE: INFORMATION FOR CONSUMERS 197-200 (1988) (discussing the paucity of research
on the validity and reliability of Joint Commission accreditation as a measure of quality).
146. Both indices were developed based on discharge abstract data from all 722,824 patients
discharged from the 51 hospitals in 1984. Helen R. Burstin et al., Correlations Between Different
Measures of Hospital Quality (1992) (abstract presented at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the Society of
General Internal Medicine) (copy on file with author).
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Martin Gottlieb, Ideas & Trends, Accreditation; Questions at the Top on Health Policy,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1992, § 4, at 18. While the National Committee to Preserve Social Security and
Medicare has not taken a position on the deemed status program for hospitals, they are hesitant to
support deemed status for Joint Commission-accredited nursing homes and home health agencies.
Letter from Martha M. Mohler, National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare, to
Timothy S. Jost (June 11, 1993) (on file with the author).
149. Walt Bogdanich, Small Comfort: Prized by Hospitals, Accreditation Hides Perils Patients Face;
Slipshod Institutions Keep Groups's Seal of Approval Even in Forced Closings, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12,
1988 at Al.
150. PMS Calls for Federal Investigation, 11 PEOPLE'S MED. SOC'Y NEWSL. (People's Medical Soc'y,
Washington, D.C.), Feb. 1992, at 1; JCAHO Accreditation Brands Hospitals Safe... But are They?, 48
PEOPLE'S MED. SOC'Y NEWSL. (People's Medical Soc'y, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 1989, at 1.
151. See STIEBER & WOLFE, supra note 16, at 29-31; JCAHO Slow to Change, 12 PEOPLE'S MED.
SoC'Y NEWSL. (People's Medical Soc'y, Washington, D.C.), April 1993, at 4; The Way JCAHO Works,
PEOPLE'S MED. SOC'Y NEWSL. (People's Medical Soc'y, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 1989, at 5.
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improperly trained inspectors, delays in processing survey reports, and difficulty
in understanding survey reports."5 2 The American Hospital Association has
also released a report critical of the Joint Commission hospital survey process,
primarily because of its high cost. 53 While complaints by accredited providers
that an accreditation program is too stringent might give cause for consumer
confidence in the accreditor, complaints of vagueness, high cost, and inefficiency
do little to reassure consumers. Hospitals became increasingly vocal in 1994,
complaining about the Joint Commission's proposals for using clinical indicators
and for publishing hospital ratings, and about the quality of the survey process
itself."s Several state hospital associations, as well as an association of
Catholic hospitals, have expressed complaints or concerns regarding the Joint
Commission in recent months, and in a widely publicized case, one hospital that
had been accredited for forty years dropped its accreditation. 55 On the other
hand, about two-thirds of health care executives 'surveyed by the Joint
Commission in 1993 said that its performance had improved over the last five
years, while only eight percent believed its performance was getting worse.56
State survey agencies report both advantages and disadvantages of relying
on Joint Commission accreditation for licensure. In a recent survey of state
licensure agencies, thirty-seven states reported benefits, with nine states
reporting more than one benefit; forty-five states reported drawbacks, with
twenty-six reporting more than one.57 Benefits frequently reported included
cost savings, national uniformity of standards, and reduction of duplication in
surveys. 58  Drawbacks frequently reported included the infrequency of
JCAHO surveys, loss of input and oversight control by the states, failure of the
Joint Commission to ensure that standards were met, and the Joint Commis-
sion's educational (as opposed to regulatory) approach to certification.159 In
general, states that relied fully on the Joint Commission for licensure tended to
report more benefits, while those that did not rely on the Joint Commission
tended to report more drawbacks."6
152. David Burda, JCAHO Gets Better Grades from Chief Execs, MOD. HEALTHCARE, May 13,1991,
at 7; JCAHO Continues to Labor Under Criticism, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE WEEK, Apr. 18,1990,
at 4.
153. David Burda, AHA Criticizes JCAHO, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Sept. 29, 1989, at 5.
154. Burda, supra note 20, at 30; David Burda, AHA Taking Close Look at Accreditation, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Apr. 18, 1994, at 3.
155. B. Rhonda Bergman, The Trials of Accreditation, HosPs. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Sept. 5, 1994,
at 42; David Burda, Meeting With La. Hospital Execs is Latest Stop for JCAHO's O'Leary, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, June 27, 1994, at 52; David Burda, Catholic Systems Seek Changes at JCAHO, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, May 9, 1994. at 6; David Burda, HANYS Studying Accreditation Needs, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Apr. 25, 1994, at 22; Burda, supra note 20, at 30; John Morrisey, Ark. Hospital Forgoes
JCAHO, MOD. HEALTHCARE, May 2, 1994, at 4.
156. David Burda, Execs' Opinion of JCAHO Slips, MOD. HEALTHCARE, May 30, 1994, at 6. The
positive ratings were down from 75% and the negative ratings were up from 3% in 1992.
157. STIEBER & WOLFE, supra note 16, at 12-13.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at Tables 4 and 5.
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Though a number of GAO reports critical of the Medicare hospital
certification process have appeared in recent years, they have tended to criticize
problems in HCFA's own certification process or in its validation of the Joint
Commission process, rather than to criticize the Joint Commission itself.161 In
addition, while congressional criticism of the deemed status program appears
from time to time,162 proposals continue to surface in Congress for expanding
reliance on Joint Commission accreditation as a benchmark of hospital
quality,163 and Joint Commission accreditation of hospitals is commonly
referred to as a mark of distinction in congressional remarks praising health
professionals or institutions.'64
The Joint Commission has often played a leading role in encouraging
progressive change in the health care industry. Examples of recent reform-
motivated additions to Joint Commission accreditation standards include
requirements that hospitals institute policies to improve communication with
non-English speaking patients, 65 to identify and protect victims of child,
domestic, or elder abuse,166 and to prohibit smoking in hospitals.1 67  The
Agenda for Change, of course, is the most prominent example of this leadership
role.
In sum, though the Joint Commission has its critics, it continues to enjoy
widespread, if not unanimous, support in its regulatory role and seems likely to
continue its regulatory function in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, there
is room for improvement in the Medicare-Joint Commission relationship. It is
to concerns about this relationship that this article now turns.
VI
ADDRESSING CONCERNS REGARDING THE MEDICARE-JOINT COMMISSION
RELATIONSHIP
One initial concern regarding the Medicare-Joint Commission relationship
involves the lack of politically accountable standards for governing Medicare
hospitals. As noted above, there is a growing divergence between the federal
Medicare conditions of participation and Joint Commission accreditation
standards. This gap is largely explained by the fact that Joint Commission
standards are continually updated while the federal participation condi-
161. See sources cited supra note 36.
162. See, e.g., 136 Cong. Rec. E2465 (daily ed. July 24, 1990) (statement of Rep. Stark).
163. See, e.g., Indian Health Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-573, § 706(c), 106 Stat. 4526,
4577 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1665e).
164. See, e.g., 138 Cong. Rec. E1791 (daily ed. June 12, 1992) (statement of Rep. Montgomery); 138
Cong. Rec. E695 (daily ed. March 17, 1992) (statement of Rep. Elton Gallegly); 137 Cong. Rec. E3839
(daily ed. Nov. 14, 1991) (statement of Rep. Lehman).
165. See Leigh Page, Lost in the Translation; Medicine is Grappling with a Surge of Patients who
Don't Speak English, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 1, 1993, at 25, 26.
166. Teri Randall, AMA, Joint Commission Urges Physicians Become Part of Solution to Family
Violence Epidemic, 266 JAMA 2524, 2524 (1991).
167. See Michael C. Fiore, Smoke-Free Hospitals: A. Time for Universal Action, 102 CHEST 1317,
1317-18 (1992).
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tions-which reflect Joint Commission standards of a decade ago-are not.
Nonetheless, it is disquieting to some that hospitals participating in the Medicare
program are largely being regulated under private standards that are only
tenuously related to standards created under the publicly accountable process
of notice and comment rulemaking.'t
One solution to this problem would be to declare the Joint Commission a
public agency, governed by the APA.169 This would likely, however, subject
the Joint Commission to the same regulatory paralysis that characterizes HCFA.
Moreover, it is probably unnecessary. The Joint Commission, in fact, has its
own internal notice and comment policy. Joint Commission standards are
developed by task forces of experts acting under the supervision of the Board
of Commissioners' Standards and Survey Procedures Committee and of the
appropriate Professional and Technical Advisory Committee, each of which
contains expert representatives of professional groups and at least one public
member.17° Draft standards that emerge from these committees are subjected
to a "field review" by practitioners, provider organizations, government
representatives, consumers, and persons representing regulated entities.17
Standards are then tested for twelve to eighteen months prior to their full
implementation. While this process may not include all of the interest groups
that would participate in notice and comment rulemaking, it does assure some
public input.
Rather than subjecting the Joint Commission to APA requirements, a better
approach might be for HCFA itself to publish in the Federal Register a notice
of new Joint Commission standards on which deemed status is based.'72 If
policies were published at the time the Joint Commission submits its standards
for field review, interested parties would be able to make their opposition to
proposed policies known to the Joint Commission, Congress, and HCFA. Since
HHS retains residual power to adopt standards more stringent than JCAHO
requirements, it could in the face of sufficient public concern, initiate its own
rulemaking procedures to override Joint Commission standard changes.
A second concern centers on the Joint Commission's enforcement abilities.
While the concern about the accountability of Joint Commission standards is
largely theoretical, the performance of the Joint Commission in the area of
survey and enforcement has provoked more real controversy. It is a simple fact
168. See, e.g., GAO, MONITORING, supra note 36, at 7-8.
169. See Jost, supra note 3, at 886-92.
170. See JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 17, 35-36; see also Roberts et al., supra note 3, at 939.
171. Roberts et al., supra note 3, at 939. Private standard-setting bodies often have procedures to
encourage broad participation in setting standards. See CHEIT, supra note 108, at 216-18.
172. Compare procedures created by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 for publishing
policies affecting the PRO program. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-2(h)(i) (1988) ("The Secretary shall publish in
the Federal Register any new policy or procedure adopted by the Secretary that affects substantially
•.. the performance of [PRO contract obligations] not less than 30 days before the date on which such
policy or procedure is to take effect.").
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that the Joint Commission rarely denies or revokes accreditation. 73 It is also
true that the HCFA validation process continues to identify hospitals that have
retained accreditation despite serious shortcomings. This should not be
surprising. It is obviously not in the interests of either the Joint Commission or
its members to get the reputation of an aggressive enforcer, frequently
subjecting mediocre facilities to the embarrassment of accreditation termina-
tion.174 Nevertheless, it is questionable whether government regulation would
be any more effective.
Here a word needs to be said about the HHS validation process. State
survey agencies, as noted earlier, regularly survey a sample of Joint Commis-
sion-accredited hospitals to validate Joint Commission findings. 17  HCFA
must report annually to Congress the results of its validation surveys.176 The
most recent report, for the fiscal years 1991 and 1992, concluded, as it had in its
previous reports, that "in general, Joint Commission accreditation does, in fact,
provide reasonable assurance that accredited hospitals meet Federal require-
ments."1"
HCFA reached this conclusion despite the fact that its validation surveys
regularly find a high number of accredited hospitals out of compliance with the
Medicare standards of participation at the time of the validation survey. In
1992, fifty-seven of the 167 accredited hospitals (34%) subjected to a validation
survey did not meet one or more Medicare conditions of participation. Many
of the problems HCFA discovered had already been noted by the Joint
Commission, however. The validation report concluded that the Joint
Commission enforced some standards, such as quality assurance and infection
control, more vigorously than the state survey agencies that perform validation
surveys, whereas the state survey agencies enforced others, most notably life
safety requirements, more vigorously than the Joint Commission. 78 In sum,
HCFA concluded that JCAHO and state survey results were equivalent. HCFA
has also reached this conclusion in reports from previous years.
179
173. See 1 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICARE: A STRATEGY FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE 129
(Kathleen N. Lohr ed., 1990); Full Survey Decision Outcomes, JOINT COMMISSION PERSPECTIVES, July-
Aug. 1991, at 16.
174. It is also not always clear that the public would be better served by termination of deficient
hospitals where the alternative is a significant curtailment of access to hospital care in rural or inner-city
areas.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 1395aa(c) (1988); 42 C.F.R. § 488.6 (1993). Currently, approximately 200 accredited
facilities are surveyed each year, including 125 that are surveyed within 60 days of the Joint Commission
accreditation survey, about 50 that are surveyed 18 months into the accreditation survey, and about 25
that were conditionally accredited by the Joint Commission. Telephone Interview with Rachel
Weinstein, Health Insurance Specialist, HCFA, (Mar. 3, 1993, Mar. 5, 1993) [hereinafter Weinstein
Interview].
176. 42 U.S.C. § 139511(b) (1988).
177. HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., REPORT ON MEDICARE
VALIDATION SURVEYS OF HOSPITALS ACCREDITED BY THE JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION
OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS (JOINT COMMISSION), FISCAL YEAR 1991 AND FISCAL YEAR 1992
63 (1992) [hereinafter HCFA REPORT].
178. Id. at 64.
179. GAO, CRITERIA, supra note 36, at 5, 6.
[Vol. 57: No. 4
MEDICARE AND THE JCAHO
Though the primary purpose of the validation survey process is to test the
validity of the Joint Commission survey process, validation surveys are also used
for enforcement purposes. A facility determined by a validation survey to be
out of compliance with one or more conditions of participation and to have a
significant deficiency will no longer be deemed to meet the conditions of
participation."s If conditions in the facility jeopardize the health and safety
of patients or seriously limit the provider's capacity to render adequate care, the
facility is subject to fast track termination."'1 If conditions are deficient, but
not this serious, the facility must submit a correction plan and achieve
compliance within a reasonable period of time, usually sixty days.1 2 Alterna-
tively, a deficient facility can remain in deemed accreditation status if (1) the
accrediting body accepts the state survey agency's finding of deficiencies and
agrees to monitor correction of the deficiencies within a specified time frame,
(2) the state is unable to justify to HCFA the need for continued review by the
state survey agency to assure correction, and (3) the accrediting body provides
HCFA with periodic reports of progress toward correction."' An accredited
hospital dissatisfied with the results of a validation survey can request an
informal review from HCFA within fifteen days.8'4 Deemed status will be
reinstated once HCFA finds that the hospital meets all Medicare conditions of
participation."
HCFA's enforcement program has in fact been neither more aggressive nor
more effective than that of the Joint Commission. Under its current arrange-
ments with the Joint Commission, HCFA does not learn that the Joint
Commission has identified a hospital as having sufficiently serious problems as
to justify conditional accreditation until four months or more after the
accreditation survey.s 6 Once the Joint Commission notifies HCFA of a
problem in an accredited facility, HCFA must, if it chooses to terminate the
facility, build its own termination case, duplicating the Joint Commission's
effort. HCFA rarely goes through this process. Though thirty-five percent of
accredited hospitals were given termination notices by HCFA during the
180. A facility that refuses to cooperate with a validation survey is no longer deemed to meet
Medicare certification requirements and can be terminated by Medicare. 42 C.F.R. § 488.6(c) (1993).
181. Id. § 489.53(b)(2) (1993).
182. Id. § 488.28 (1993).
183. Id. § 488.6(d)(2).
184. Id. § 488.6(f).
185. Id. § 488.6(e)(4). HCFA also contracts with state survey agencies to investigate complaints that
allege noncompliance with conditions of participation in accredited facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 1395aa(c)
(1988). If the problems alleged do not rise to the level of noncompliance with conditions of
participation, HCFA will forward the complaint to the Joint Commission and notify the complainant
that the complaint has been forwarded. Weinstein Interview, supra note 175.
186. Telephone interview with Terry Harris, Health Insurance Specialist, HCFA (Mar. 5, 1993). In
1989, when congressional hearings were held the delay was 15 months. See Hearings, supra note 102,
at 3, 28 (statement of Gail R. Wilensky). This delay was clearly unacceptable to HHS. See Charles D.
Bankhead, Performance Complaints Bring JCAHO Under Scrutiny, MED. WORLD NEWS, Oct. 1990, at
14.
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validation process in- FY 1992, none were in fact terminated from Medicare."
Indeed, facilities that have had their accreditation revoked by the Joint
Commission have on occasion subsequently been certified to participate in
Medicare by HCFA after a state survey1t 8
In sum, then, validation surveys regularly identify significant deficiencies in
accredited facilities, but these facilities are rarely decertified by HCFA. 9
Given the paucity of HCFA's resources and its historical lack of interest in
enforcement, this is not surprising. Unfortunately, the absence of state and
federal enforcement actions against hospitals leaves little room for hoping that
the public would be substantially better served by direct federal regulation of
hospitals than by Joint Commission regulation. Moreover, as the Joint
Commission has in recent years moved toward a variety of levels of accredita-
tion and toughened up its enforcement by requiring most hospitals it surveys to
clear up deficiencies following the survey,"9 the advantage that a public
enforcement program may have at one time enjoyed over Joint Commission
accreditation has diminished.1 9' Neither approach to quality evaluation seems
clearly superior from the standpoint of enforcement.
Though the argument for substituting a public regulatory program for the
current Joint Commission/public regulation partnership is weak, the effective-
ness of the current arrangement could be improved by better targeting HHS's
validation effort. Targeting the validation effort upon conditionally accredited
hospitals was a good first step in this direction. Surveys could be targeted
further at hospitals identified by PROs as being problem facilities or hospitals
with extraordinarily high risk-adjusted mortality rates. Timing of validation
surveys might also be important. HCFA's recent efforts to conduct validation
surveys at the midpoint of the JCAHO survey cycle has resulted in the finding
of substantially more violations.1" Finally, validation surveys could focus on
certain standards, such as fire safety code compliance, on which the Joint
Commission puts less emphasis. Targeting of this kind might result in more
stringent regulation of problem hospitals.
A third concern regarding the Medicare-Joint Commission relationship is the
inability of the Joint Commission to deal with regulatory concerns other than
quality. The original Medicare statute required deemed status hospitals to meet
a separate federal requirement for utilization review, which was then absent
187. HCFA REPORT, supra note 177, at 59, 62.
188. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 173, at 129; Hearings, supra note 102, at 22-24.
189. See GAO, INADEQUATE, supra note 36, at 3.
190. See Mary T. Koska, JCAHO: Safety, Medical Staff issues Hinder Compliance, HOSPITALS, Apr.
5, 1992, at 46 (during 1987-89, two-thirds of the nation's hospitals were subject to accreditation
contingencies).
191. In fact, most public enforcement programs rely, like the Joint Commission, on prodding
compliance rather than rigidly imposing sanctions. See Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas, The
Enforcement Process in Regulatory Bureaucracies, in ENFORCING REGULATION 3 (Keith Hawkins &
John M. Thomas eds., 1984).
192. HCFA REPORT, supra note 177, at 63.
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from Joint Commission requirements.193 Though the Joint Commission
subsequently adopted a utilization review requirement, and though the Joint
Commission's emergency care standards have played a positive role in assuring
access to health care for indigents,"9 the Joint Commission has not taken the
lead in assuring access or cost control. Nor could it, given its need to be
responsive to its members. Indeed, as cost control issues come to the fore,
people may increasingly question whether Joint Commission standards in fact
lead to excessive costs in the provision of hospital care.
The Joint Commission was earlier identified as partly a cross-regulation
program-as doctors regulating hospitals. Other cross-regulatory interventions
in health care are also conceivable, however. Most notably, health insurers
could sponsor accreditation entities, attuned particularly to standards that would
lower cost, while preserving acceptable, if not optimal, quality. The National
Committee for Quality Assurance, for example, which accredits HMOs, includes
on its twelve-member board employee benefits managers, consumer advocates,
and labor leaders, and is seeking support from major employers.195 To
maintain its competitive position or to become more responsive to health care
purchasers, the Joint Commission may in the end have to consider cost of care
as well as quality in establishing and enforcing its accreditation standards. In
the interim, complementary regulatory approaches are necessary to address cost
and access problems.
A fourth and final concern is whether the federal government, by relying on
the Joint Commission for regulating hospitals, has endorsed too narrow and
monolithic a vision of health care, thereby unreasonably limiting patient choice.
Professor Clark Havighurst has on several occasions articulated the view that
a multiplicity of accreditors is necessary to facilitate consumer choice, even
suggesting that the Joint Commission should be broken up, stimulating each of
its members to pursue competing accreditation programs.1" Though the
antitrust law arguments in which Professor Havighurst finds legal support for his
position are beyond the scope of this article,1" the larger policy issues raised
by him must be addressed.
There is much to be said for competing accreditation programs and for
governmental recognition of multiple programs, where accreditation entities in
fact articulate sufficiently distinct visions of health care to permit consumer
193. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 102(a), § 1861(e)(6), 79 Stat. 286,
314-15, 326-27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
194. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d 605,612 (Ariz. 1984) (holding
that hospital may not transfer emergency room patient solely for financial reasons under Joint
Commission standards incorporated by state law).
195. See Julie Johnsson, Groups Vie for Lucrative Managed Care Accreditation Business, HOSPITALS,
Apr. 5, 1990, at 35, 38.
196. See Clark C. Havighurst & Nancy M. P. King, Private Credentialing of Health Care Personnel:
An Antitrust Perspective, Part 2, 9 AM. J. L. & MED. 263, 323-25 (1983); Clark C. Havighurst,
Accreditation Competition Needed, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Nov. 16, 1992, at 24.
197. See Clark C. Havighurst & Peter M. Brody, Accrediting and the Sherman Act 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 199 (Autumn, 1994).
Page 15: Autumn 19941
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
choice. Thus, the Medicare program has long recognized deemed status for
both Joint Commission-accredited and American Osteopathic Association-
accredited hospitals, permitting Medicare beneficiaries to make the relatively
intelligible choice between osteopathic and allopathic hospitals.1 The recent
decision of HCFA to recognize both accreditation by the Community Health
Accreditation Program and the Joint Commission for home health agencies
arguably gives consumers a choice between home health programs that tend
alternatively toward more of a nursing versus a medical orientation.' Where
alternative accreditation programs do not offer consumers as apparent a
philosophical choice, however, it is less clear that competing accreditation
programs would be beneficial.
Examples of competition in health care that does not benefit consumers
come readily to mind. Insurers have traditionally competed for identifying low-
risk insureds (and eliminating high-risk insureds) rather than for offering the
best benefit packages at the lowest cost.' Hospitals have traditionally
competed to attract physicians who will increase admissions rather than to
attract consumers by offering lower prices. 1  Given the difficulty patients
have historically faced in obtaining and evaluating quality and price information
regarding providers, it is not surprising that the health care industry has not
performed like more traditional competitive markets where consumers can
readily make informed choices.
Similarly, it is quite possible that multiple accreditors would compete in ways
not beneficial to consumers. Since accreditors depend on fees paid by
accredited institutions to survive, accreditors would be likely to compete first
and foremost for the business of institutions seeking accreditation. In this
market, those accreditors whose standards were most easily met or whose
surveys were least intrusive would enjoy a competitive advantage. Alternatively,
the accreditor with the lowest fees might gain an advantage, even if charging
less meant less thorough accreditation surveys. Unless consumers had some
means of evaluating the comparative quality of accreditation programs, it is
unlikely that alternative accreditation entities would benefit consumers, or that
multiple accreditors would compete to better serve them.
Were the government to recognize multiple accreditors, moreover, these
accreditors may become more dependent upon the entities they accredit, and
thus less free to exercise their independent professional judgment and less
responsive as regulators. It was argued above that over the years the reliance
of the federal and state governments on the Joint Commission for regulating
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hospitals has both freed the Joint Commission to operate somewhat indepen-
dently of the institutions it accredits and made it more responsive to govern-
ment concerns (for example, disclosure of information and rigor of the
accreditation process), because of its interest in maintaining government-
endorsement of its programs. Were the Joint Commission merely one of several
government-endorsed accreditors, this motivation might be severely diminished.
Where clear and easily understandable differences in accreditation
philosophy exist, it makes sense to have multiple accreditors. Where differences
among accreditors are less transparent to consumers, however, the public is
better served by a single accreditor that is subject to rigorous governmental
oversight, than by multiple accreditors competing for the favor of providers.
VII
CONCLUSION
Accreditation has traditionally been identified with industry self-regulation.
The federal government's reliance on private accreditation for guaranteeing the
quality of Medicare participating providers has thus been seen as suspect by
those who fear that self-regulation is a poor vehicle for protecting consumers.
The self-regulation model is too simplistic to explain the Joint Commission,
however. The Joint Commission is responsive not only to the hospitals it
accredits, but also to the physicians who created it and still play a major role in
its governance, and to the federal and state governments whose recognition
effectively gives the Joint Commission monopoly power in the hospital
accreditation business. In the future, the Commission may also become
responsive to the consumer or employer alliances that will direct the purchase
of health care. Because it must respond to these various interests, the Joint
Commission is arguably better able to assure the quality of health care than
would be any simple self-regulatory body.
The Joint Commission could and should be more accountable to the public
and more rigorous in the application of its accreditation standards. The federal
government should be more rigorous in its validation process to assure the
quality of Joint Commission decisions. The deemed status program, however,
should be abandoned only if and when a more effective program can be devised
to police and to encourage quality institutional health care. There is little
reason to believe that such a program will be forthcoming.
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